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       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-2403 
___________ 
 
HOWARD P. BROBST,  
 individually and as officer of H.C. & S Enterprises, 
Inc., and for the Estate of Carol L. Brobst, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-15-cv-01468) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 1, 2016 
 
Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 8, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                                                
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellant Howard P. Brobst appeals the dismissal of his Complaint based on a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
We will affirm. 
I. 
 Brobst’s Complaint alleged at its core that the disposition of his bankruptcy 
proceedings in the 1990s had been procured by fraud, and that the presiding Bankruptcy 
Judge and other agents of the federal judiciary and executive departments perpetrated that 
fraud.  Through a business he owned, Brobst had personally guaranteed the mortgage on 
a property that suffered severe storm damage, resulting in acrimonious relationships 
between him, his insurance company, and his bank.  Brobst and the business filed for 
bankruptcies.  In the midst of the bankruptcy proceedings, Brobst alleged that his own 
counsel entered into fraudulent stipulations with his creditors as part of a conspiratorial 
cabal arrayed against Brobst’s own interests.  Brobst alleges that he informed the 
presiding bankruptcy judge, Judge Twardowski, of the supposed fraud, but that Judge 
Twardowski failed to act and that this, in turn, constituted a “fraud upon the court.”  The 
bankruptcies were discharged in 2000.  On July 29, 2015, Brobst filed suit against the 
United States of America seeking damages and “a ruling that the United States 
perpetrated a fraud upon the Court.”  Compl. at 25.   
 The United States filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) 
and 12(b)(6).  The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation concluding 
that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Brobst’s claim because it 
was barred by sovereign immunity.  Brobst objected and moved for the appointment of 
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counsel.  The District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and denied the 
motion for appointment of counsel on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction 
to hear the case.  Brobst now appeals. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We engage in 
plenary review of the District Court’s dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).  Solis v. Local 234, Transp. Workers Union, 585 F.3d 
172, 176 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review a district court’s denial of counsel to an indigent 
civil litigant for abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 
498 (3d Cir. 2002).  We can affirm on any ground supported by the record.  Hughes v. 
Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 Having carefully reviewed the record on appeal, we agree with the District Court’s 
conclusion that appellant’s claims as presented are barred by the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.   Here, the only named defendant is the United States of America.  It is well-
settled that the United States has sovereign immunity except where it consents to be sued.  
See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).  The District Court properly 
concluded, therefore, that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Brobst’s 
claims against the United States.1 
                                                                
1 The Federal Tort Claims Act is of no assistance to Brobst because claims arising out of 
“misrepresentation [or] deceit” are specifically exempted from the FTCA’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity.  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  Accordingly, Brobst’s “fraud on the court” 
claims would fall squarely within this carveout to the FTCA. 
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 Because this lack of jurisdiction deprived the court of its “very power to hear the 
case,” Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006), the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint counsel to represent Brobst, Montgomery, 
294 F.3d at 499.  Brobst now argues that the District Court should have granted his 
motion for the appointment of counsel so that he could have amended his complaint to 
name “executives or officials in the government as a proxy for the government itself, 
thereby giving the court subject-matter jurisdiction.”  Appellant’s Br. at 3-4.  The United 
States contends that Brobst has waived this argument by not raising it in the District 
Court. 
 In the context of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, we have instructed that, 
“[w]hen a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend a deficient complaint after a defendant 
moves to dismiss it, the court must inform the plaintiff that he has leave to amend within 
a set period of time, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.”  Grayson v. 
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  Here, the District Court was 
silent on amendment.  While we have not spoken to this issue directly in the context of a 
Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the District Court’s silence is of no moment because amendment 
would nonetheless have been futile, for two reasons.  First, the only proper defendant in 
an FTCA action is the United States and so Brobst could not seek to take advantage of 
any of its provisions with individual defendants.  Second, the Complaint contains no 
allegations that would support claims of a constitutional tort against new individual 
defendants.  See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the 
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District Court to decline to give Brobst leave to amend his complaint or to appoint 
counsel for the purpose of filing a futile amended complaint.   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
